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difficulties which beset the path of the Chinese Government in these days were immense. Public opinion was making itself telt everywhere, new ideas were permeating the masses, and to put the matter frankly, there was a national awakening with which the statesmen of to-day had to reckon. The people had awoken from their long sleep and were taking stock of the situation.
Turning to the specific causes of complaint which I had brought to his notice, his Highness said that a settlement of the Shansi difficulty was, he thought, in sight. He had personally conferred with Ting, the Judge of the province, and they had agreed upon a plan of action which, on the Judge's return to Shansi in about two months time, would be submitted to the Agent-General of the Syndicate through the Shansi Bureau of Commerce. The Governor of the province was not a man of sufficient grit to deal with the question, but he had confidence in the Judge's capacity to bring it to a successful solution. The Syndicate itself was not altogether without blame for what had occurred as it was very slow in taking any steps to work its Concession at the outset.
His Highness regarded the condition of the railway negotiations as much more hopeful than I had described it. The Tien-tsin-Yang-tsze line was, he understood, making good progress between M. Cordes and his Excellency Liang Tun-yen, and he foresaw a speedy settlement of that question.
The Soochow -Ningpo extension presented greater difficulties, but there also he contended that the Imperial Government had given practical proof of its desire to expedite matters as much as possible. Two months ago the question had been placed in the hands of Wang, the late Minister in London, whose position and experience rendered him peculiarly fit to deal with it. He had received his instructions imme- diately he landed in Shanghae a fortnight or so ago, and had since been actively engaged in paving the way for the opening of negotiations. The Prince regretted that Wang Ta-jên was prevented by illness from being present to give an account of his doings. In conclusion, the Prince desired me to convey an earnest assurance to His Majesty's Government that the Imperial Government would faithfully carry out all its engagements.
I said that it would be my duty to do so, but that I should be glad if the Prince could furnish me with some more definite statement, as a general assurance coming even from his Highness could scarcely be expected to carry much weight after all the promises which had been transmitted in the past. What was now required was, not fresh promises, but performance, and nothing short of this would remove the grave feeling of disappointment felt by His Majesty's Government.
The Prince expressed a hope that I did not doubt the sincerity of his assurances, and said that his wish was to treat us in the most friendly manner. Other Powers had quite as good grounds for grievances as we had, and he appealed to me as one who had had long experience of China to have patience with the Chinese Government in its difficulties.
The Prince, I remarked, had spoken frankly about the national awakening, the state of feeling in the provinces, and other recent changes which rendered the task of the Central Government difficult.
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He would in return concede me the privilege of laying frankly before him some of the views which the altered situation suggested to others. The so-called national awakening was largely the work of students who had returned from Japan with a dangerous smattering of knowledge. Their sentiments formed the “ public opinion on which the policy of the Central Government was based. The students ruled the provinces, and the provinces ruled Peking. What struck the forcigu observer as the essential difference between the China of to-day and the Japan of sonic thirty years ago was this:---
In her elder Statesmen Japan had a central authority which guided the country and exercised the right, when occasion required it, of imposing its will upon the people. In Peking the Wai-wu Pa was content to meet its Imperial engagements by the admission that it could give counsel, but not orders to the provinces. I had no hesitation in saying that twenty years ago the conduct of business was much easier with the old Tsung-li Yamén than it is with the reformed Wai-wn Pu, and the Prince as President of both Boards could pronounce upon the justice of the assertion.
His Excellency Na Tung, who was present, was disposed to demur to this statement and professed inability to understand our anxiety about railway concessions which appeared to him to be progressing favourably. As the active member of the Wai-wu Pu who was now largely responsible for its work, he would guarantee to do his utmost to see that they were put through as soon as possible.
I pointed out that we had not used our Concessions as other Powers had for the
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advancement of political objects, and that the return we received for this disinterested action was that, while other nations were running their own railways on Chinese soil, we were debarred from constructing railways on terms which, as the recent Canton-Kowloon Agreement demonstrated, were conceived in the best interests of China herself. I con- sidered myself justified in pressing for some definite assurance that effect would be given to our railway engagements within a limited space of time, but all I could extract was a statement from Na Tung that he hoped within a few days to be able to tell me how far Mr. Wang was in a position to enter upon the negotiations for the Soochow-Ningpo line. The consideration of the Thibetan question, which I had discussed on the previous day with Na Tang and on which I am reporting in another despatch, was continued at this interview, and I adduced the indifference which China had shown with regard to her engagements under the Adhesion Agreement of the 27th April, 1906, as another of the incidents which had produced a very unfavourable impression upon His Majesty's Government. In agreeing to accept payment of the indemnity from China, in fixing the date for the opening of trade-marts, in consenting to negotiate the amendment of the Trade Regulations with China and Thibet, instead of with Thibet alone, and in numerous other ways we had given substantial proofs of our desire to act in a spirit of friendly co-operation with China. This was not a case in which the Chinese Government could plead the exigencies of public opinion as an excuse for their action, and yet despite all the assurances of the Central Government, their officials on the spot had for months pursued a policy of gratuitous obstruction.
The Grand Secretary, Na Tung, interposed with the suggestion that we should let bygones be bygones on this question and look forward to smoother relations in the future. I reciprocated the wish and took my leave after an interview of nearly two hours.
The question of bringing pressure to bear upon China to secure the fulfilment of Railway and Mining Concessions is a peculiarly difficult one. There is undoubtedly a strong public feeling on the subject which has means of making itself felt in ways that were unknown a few years ago. The American boycott and the Shanghae riot are recent instances of concerted retaliation of this kind. The correspondence forwarded in your despatch No. 214 of the 28th May will already have shown you the apprehensions which the Peking Syndicate's case has caused amongst the missionaries in Shansi, aud several of them have assured me personally that any attempt to enforce the Syndicate's claims by material pressure would endanger the lives of all foreigners in the province, I think, therefore, it may be safely said that so far as Mining Concessions are concerned the interests involved, great as they are, are not sufficient to justify the risk of attempting to enforce them by other than ordinary diplomatic methods.
Opinions will probably differ as to whether pressure of the kind indicated is likely to retard or hasten the completion of our railway negotiations, but there are many other considerations to be taken into account. Even if we force the Central Government to accept the Concessions on paper, the provinces can give us infinite trouble in carrying them into effect, and without their good-will even the purchase of the land might be a matter of difficulty.
But the advice which I have ventured to offer in my telegram No. 132 is largely based upon the belief, which events may not possibly justify, that with patience and perseverance we shall eventually secure the fulfilment of our railway obligations.
I have, &c. (Signed) J. N. JORDAN,
mmin do! I'
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